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ARGUMENT
L

RESPONDENT FAILS TO CORRECTLY STATE AND APPLY THE
APPLICABLE STANDARD OF REVIEW. FURTHER, PETITIONER IS
NOT REQUIRED TO MARTIAL THE EVIDENCE WHEN
CHALLENGING THE ULTIMATE CONCLUSION OF THE TRIAL
COURT REGARDING COMMON RESIDENCY.
Respondent has failed to adequately state, and as a result apply, the applicable

standard of review. Respondent provides the elements that must be met in order to
satisfy cohabitation, and then concludes that if these elements are met, alimony is
terminated. Respondent's Brief at 10. Following, Respondent provides citations to case
law regarding the discretion available to trial courts in determining the appropriateness of
modifications, and issues regarding alimony. Id. at 10-11. Missing from Respondent's
analysis is the standard of review, specifically, that u[w]hether cohabitation exists 'is a
mixed question of fact and law. While we defer to the trial court's factual findings unless
they are shown to be clearly erroneous, we review its ultimate conclusion for
correctness.'" Jensen v. Jensen, 2007 UT App 377, \ 2, 173 P.3d 223, quoting Pendleton
v. Pendleton, 918 P.2d 159, 160 (Utah Ct. App. 1996); See also Haddow v. Haddow, 101
P.2d 669, 671 (Utah 1985) ("the determination of whether given circumstances constitute
cohabitation requires the application of the terms of a court order to a given set of facts.
This process is in reality a mixed question of fact and law, and we are not bound by the
conclusion reached by the trial court.").
This failure to recognize and formulate arguments in accordance with the standard
of review is evident in Respondent's argument that Petitioner has failed to adequately
I
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martial the evidence in regard to common residency. Respondent's brief at 16-19. What
Respondent fails to recognize is that Petitioner does not dispute the findings that the trial
court made in regard to common residency, but rather the ultimate conclusion of the trial
court when applying those findings to the applicable law. Under these circumstances, in
accordance with the standard of review that the ultimate conclusion of the trial court is.
reviewed for correctness, Petitioner is not required to martial the evidence. See Jensen,
2007 UTApp 377,T[2.
Respondent also confuses findings of fact with conclusions of law. The
conclusion of the trial court was that "Petitioner and Mike Hart had a common
residency," and it is this ultimate conclusion that Petitioner challenges on appeal. R. at
185, \ 3. It is important to note that this conclusion is appropriately contained in the
"Conclusions of Law" section of the trial court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law, R. at 188 & 185. It was Respondent who drafted the Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law. R. at 188 & 184. Respondent appears to treat this ultimate
conclusion, incorrectly, as a finding of fact in Respondent's brief. Again, Petitioner does
not challenge the findings that the trial court made in regard to the residency issue.
Rather, Petitioner argues that these findings of fact, and the evidence supporting them,
were inadequate to support the trial court's ultimate conclusion that a common residency
existed between Petitioner and Mr. Hart. The trial court's ultimate conclusion that a
common residency existed, is reviewed for correctness. Jensen, 2007 UT App 377,1f 2.

2
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Therefore, Respondent's arguments that Petitioner has failed to martial the evidence in
regard to common residency should be disregarded.
IL

RESPONDENT WRONGLY MINIMIZES THE IMPORTANCE OF
FACTORS IN DETERMINING WHETHER OR NOT A COMMON
RESIDENCY EXISTS.
Respondent wrongly minimizes the importance of factors in determining whether

or not a common residency exists. As a result, Respondent's conclusion that a common
residency was shared between Petitioner and Mr. Hart is incorrect. In order for a
common residency to exist, it must be shown that there was a "sharing of a common
abode that both parties consider their principal domicile for more than a temporary or
brief period of time." Haddow, 707 P.2d at 672. Further, common residency "implies
continuity, not simply a habit of visiting or a sojourn." Pendleton, 918 P.2d at 160.
There are several factors that a trial court can and should consider when making this
determination. Specifically, the sharing of living expenses, whether or not the parties had
access to each other's living quarters, if the parties eat together regularly, share food
expenses, and whether or not the parties kept clothing or other personal items in each
other's living quarters. See Haddow, 707 P.2d at 673-674; Pendleton, 918 P,2d at 161;
and Jensen, 2007 UT App. 377,fflf2-3. While it is true that no one factor is dispositive
on its own, these factors are important, relevant and material to any determination that a
common residency exists. Further, where all of the factors fail to be satisfied, the trial
court's ultimate conclusion that a common residency exists is incorrect, and

3
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Respondent's attempt to minimize their relevance is misguided. See Haddow, 707 P.2d
673.
In regard to the sharing of living expenses, Respondent states that in this case, the
factor is "irrelevant to the question of common residency." Respondent's Brief at 15.
The flaw in this reasoning is obvious in light of the Utah Supreme Court's comment that
"[although we do not consider the sharing of the financial obligations surrounding the
maintenance of a household to be a requisite element of cohabitation, we do find it
significant that Mr. Hudson did not pay any of appellant's living expenses or consistently
share with her any of his assets." Haddow, 707 P.2d at 673 (emphasis added). Clearly it
is relevant, just not dispositive. It is not Petitioner's assertion that the failure to share
living expenses automatically nullifies the trial court's ultimate conclusion, however, its
absence in this case is important when none of the other factors commonly examined by
the Utah Court of Appeals and Supreme Court of Utah are satisfied.
Respondent next addresses the issue of whether or not the parties had access to
each other's living quarters. Respondent's Brief at 15. Respondent states that "both Mr.
Hart and Appellant came and went from the residence as they pleased, and that they both
had access to each others living quarters." Id. It is true that Petitioner's living quarters
were more or less a common area in the home and as a result were not conducive to
excluding others. Specifically, Petitioner was sleeping on a couch in her parents' home.
See R. at 186: 9; Tr. at 12:24, 106:1-2, and 107:1-3. As a result, the living arrangements
present in this matter do not fit neatly into the situation where two individuals have their
4
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own private residences with a resultant expectation of privacy, but have unfettered access
to each other's private residence. For example, consider the living arrangements present
in Pendleton, where the boyfriend "had his own key to Joyce's home," and "he came and
went from Joyce's home three to four times daily, even when she was not there." 918
P.2d at 161. What is important here is that Petitioner did not have unfettered access to
Mr. Hart's living quarters, which were meant to be private. Mr. Hart had his own room,
which was shared with a roommate. Tr. at 106:1-2 & 17-23, and 107:1-7. There is a
complete lack of evidence that Petitioner had any access to Mr. Hart's living quarters.
This fact is completely ignored by Respondent. Respondent only makes the conclusory
statement that both parties "had access to each other's living quarters," and fails to cite to
anything to support that assertion. Respondent's Brief at 15. As was stated in
Petitioner's initial brief, this situation is similar to that in Jensen, where the party was
found to not share a common residence with her boyfriend even though she stayed at her
boyfriend's residence "off and on for two months," and shared "a bedroom with Mr.
Andrews's sister." 2007 UT App. 377, \ 2. It is also akin to the living arrangements that
exist in a boarding house where the parties have open access to the structure they are
living in, but maintain their own separate quarters.
Finally, Respondent addresses the issue of whether or not Mr. Hart and Petitioner
ate together regularly, shared food expenses, or kept clothing or other personal property
in the same bedroom. See Respondent's Brief at 15-16. Instead of pointing to specific
findings, Respondent instead argues what the trial court may have assumed. Specifically,
5
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Respondent states "[regarding food expenses, it is a reasonable assumption from the
evidence that neither she nor Mr. Hart paid for food, as that was provided by Appellant's
parents;" that "[t]he Court could also reasonably assume from the fact that neither of
them maintained another permanent residence that the Appellant and Mr. Hart both kept
personal property and clothing at the residence;" and finally "[t]he Court could also
reasonably find that they probably ate together." Id. at 16. What is important is that the
trial court made no specific findings as to these issues; it is simply lacking anywhere in
the transcript and record. Respondent's assertions as to what the trial court may have
assumed are therefore irrelevant and should be ignored.
Respondent would ask for an oversimplified analysis where the fact that the same
structure is being lived in is enough. If that were all that were required, it seems
nonsensical that the Utah Court of Appeals and Supreme Court of Utah would bother
looking at any of the factors that are discussed in cohabitation cases. All that would be
required is that the parties either shared or did not share the same address. Nothing more
would be required to either prove or disprove common residency. Therefore,
Respondent's arguments that a common residency was shared between Mr. Hart and
Petitioner are incorrect.
III.

THERE WAS NO SEXUAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MR. HART AND
PETITIONER.
Finally, Respondent argues that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it

found that there was a sexual relationship between Petitioner and Mr. Hart. Respondent's
6
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Brief at 19-22. Sexual contact is defined as "participation in a relatively permanent
sexual relationship akin to that generally existing between husband and wife.5' Haddow,
707 P.2d at 672.
Respondent states that Petitioner does not "cite any statute or case to support her
assertion that direct evidence is needed to establish sexual contact." Respondent's Brief
at 19. This is an oversimplification of Petitioner's argument. In light of Respondent's
statement however, it is worth reiterating the factual patterns present in reported
cohabitation cases in Utah, and to note that in those cases the evidence of a sexual
relationship was much stronger than it was in the present matter. For example, in several
cases it was admitted to. See Sigg v. Sigg, 905 P.2d 908, 911, n. 4 (Utah Ct. App. 1995);
Garcia v. Garcia, 2002 UT App. 381, f 2, 60 P.3d 1174; Knuteson v. Knuteson, 619 P.2d
1387, 1388 (Utah 1980); and Pendleton, 918 P.2d at 160, n.l. In other cases, the
evidence was uncontroverted. Consider Wacker v. Wacker, where on direct examination
the party "admitted that early in her relationship with Dennis Warr, they did have sexual
relations and that she gave him a venereal disease." 668 P.2d 533, 534 (Utah 1983).
Further, in Haddow, where the couple had "taken a vacation together to Hawaii, 'sleeping
in the same bed and having sexual relations.'" 707 P.2d at 672.
Direct evidence may not be necessary, but it must be more than was presented
here. No evidence was even presented showing that the two kissed, embraced, or ever
held hands. There simply is not enough evidence in this case to show a "permanent
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sexual relationship akin to that generally existing between husband and wife," and the
findings and ultimate conclusion of the trial court in this regard are incorrect. Id.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Petitioner respectfully submits that the trial court's
decision to terminate alimony be reversed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this,

0 / day of October, 2009.
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